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When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short:
Fantasy and Fetishes as Gap-Fillers in Border
Regulation

Mary D. Fan

Drawing on fieldwork and political theory with Lacanian psychoanalytic influences, this article analyzes how fantasy and fetishes help sustain strategies
shown to be no solution to U.S. border control problems. More than a decade
after the official launch of the border control paradigm of "prevention
through deterrence," predicated on the assumption that ramping up walls,
barriers, policing, and the human costs of border crossing would deter, there
has been scant evidence of deterrence and much evidence of diversion of
migrants to more dangerous crossing points where death rates have soared.
Attempts to mitigate the cost to life have also proved ineffective but have
persisted alongside the policy of diversion. The article is based on research in
a region where the reality of diversion and death instead of deterrence was
lived but where people still pursue projects of barrier-building and death
mitigation that they know to be ineffective. The article analyzes how fantasy
fuels action despite knowledge and occludes a traumatic element around
which the symbolic order of border law is structured: the foundation of "good
life" with its bounty of rights, privileges, and opportunity on the exclusion of
basic life denuded of the entitlements that make the good life sweet. The
article also examines how fetishes are used to cope with unrealized hopes and
to diffuse the impact of the traumatic knowledge that good life is undergirded
by the exclusion and even death of basic life.

A

this edge of the United States adjoining Mexico, border
control law and critiques of border policy are physically embodied.
Some people describe the frailty of law here by driving across their
property to show the "government fence" at the border-an aged
livestock fence with cut and torn wire, run through in some places
and falling down in others. For others, what is salient are the ravages of law, physically embodied for them in the bodies found in
states of suffering and decay in the desert, rerouted from other
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regions where law looms large in metal border walls and uniformed patrols.
For years, this sparsely populated region of desert and rangeland was the site of a surge in human migration and border crossing deaths. In protest from different perspectives, some people
build private border fences, while others service water tanks
marked by high blue flags. The people who enact these objects
speak in terms of their utility-the fences are meant to seal and
secure the border, the water tanks are meant to save lives, goals the
people think the government should accomplish but has failed. But
the people also see their futility-the private fences cover only tiny
slivers of the sprawling terrain and border crossers can just walk
around; several of the water tanks remain full each week because
border crossers dare not use them or are shifting farther away, to
even more remote regions, and alarming numbers of bordercrossing deaths continue.
Yet the volunteers continue to pour their efforts and passions
into these things, doing despite knowing and hoping their actions
will incite the government to deliver on promises of security and
salvaging of life. The efforts and objects present an enigma, a
metaphor, and an opportunity to examine the forces that sustain
action despite knowledge of inefficacy-a question acutely posed
by the course of border law and policy over the last decade.
In 1994, federal law enforcement officials embarked on a
strategy for border control based on the assumption that raising
the costs of entering the United States without official permission
-the
dangers, difficulty, and punitive consequences, or, in
Bentham's term, the "pain" of prohibited conduct-and their
probability would deter (Massey et al. 2002:9-11, 108-14;
Cornelius 2001:662; Office of the Inspector General 1998:§ I.C;
compare Bentham [1789] 1961:170). Millions of dollars were
poured into diverting unauthorized migrant traffic to more
remote, harsher deserts and mountains-called "more hostile
terrain" in the strategic plan-by heavily fortifying and policing
the customary crossing places in more temperate environs closer to
urban centers, made security priority areas (see U.S. Border Patrol
1994:2, 7; Nevins 2002:4).
The raised cost that the strategy levied for unauthorized migration turned out to be denominated in life. Though the number
of border-crossing deaths was on the decline between 1990 and
1994, after the launch of the strategy's first phase, dubbed Operation Gatekeeper, yearly deaths more than doubled between 1994
and 2005, reaching 472 deaths in just 2005 alone (U.S. General
Accounting Office 2006:6-9, 15-16; 2001:5-6). But the fundamental assumption behind the strategy-that raising costs would
deter-proved wrong. Soaring death rates and unabated migrant
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traffic showed that people were paying the ultimate price rather
than being deterred (see Massey et al. 2002:108-14).
Trying to abate the numbers of deaths, the Border Patrol in
1998 added rescue services to its roles, providing food, water,
and medical services to lost or injured migrants and establishing
rescue beacons (U.S. General Accounting Office 2006:9). A death
mitigation strategy thus unfolded alongside the preventionthrough-deterrence paradigm. But the alarming numbers of
deaths persisted (see, e.g., McCombs 2006a:A1).
The consequences are no secret-they are broadcast by journalists and migration scholars and discussed by officials (see, e.g.,
Archibold 2007; Ellingwood 2004; Massey et al. 2002; Cornelius
2001; Eschbach et al. 1999). Congress even commissioned a
lengthy report on border deaths and diversion of migrant traffic
(U.S. General Accounting Office 2006). But despite knowledge of
the reality beyond the rhetoric of deterrence, the failed policy
paradigm persists and has even been embodied in more muscular
form in formal legislation (see, e.g., Secure Fence Act of 2006;
Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control
Act of 2005; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, discussed below in "Why Diversion Persists
After Its Discrediting").
In short, we "'know very well what [we] are doing, but still, [we]
are doing it' (2i~ek 1989:33, quoting Sloterdijk [1983] 1988). This
article analyzes the forces that lead people to keep doing despite
knowing, based on fieldwork in a region where the reality of diversion instead of deterrence was lived. Navaro-Yashin has argued
for moving beyond the traditional focus on institutional sites
in studies of the political and examining instead the practices of
everyday people where power regenerates (Navaro-Yashin 2002:3).
As with the political, so with the legal. In studies of law, the proper
sites are often conceived of as institutions and their prescribed
forms, the laws in textbooks and documents, the decisions of
jurists, the outcome of disputes. But important information about
what sustains and regenerates law, policy, and the political through
malfunction and disillusionment can be gained by studying the
people who live that malfunction and disillusionment.
This article is therefore based on 53 interviews and numerous
other conversations and interactions during seven weeks of fieldwork in one of the areas that bore the brunt of the policy of
diversion. People in this border region experienced firsthand
how Operation Gatekeeper simply rerouted migrant traffic from
formerly popular crossing points in California and Texas. They
lived the emotional and material effects of mass human movement
suddenly routed through their lives and environs. They continue
to live in the shadow of deaths from migrants crossing through the
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sun-scorched deserts or over precarious, cold mountains. Even
teenage high school freshmen talk and know of death.
The ethnographic details gathered resonate with insights about
fantasy and fetishism by political theorists influenced by Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory. People know the reality behind the rhetoric
and paradigms but continue acting in accord with the illusion
(Ziek 1989:32-3). This illusion that structures behavior is fantasy,
a "psychic symptom that survives analysis, critique or deconstruction" and "generates unconscious psychic attachments" to the very
thing criticized (Navaro-Yashin 2002:4; 2i~ek 1989:33). People
from divergent perspectives vigorously critique the state and its
policies, see and live the gap between law and policy's promises and
reality, but the very critique regenerates desire for the omniscient
power of the government and the law to fix things somehow, if only.
The concept of law and political forms as symbols that supply
comfort and reassurance has long roots in the works of writers such
as Arnold and Edelman (e.g., Edelman 1964:2, 32, 38, 40, 42;
Arnold 1935:34-5). Arnold noted that what we revere as "Law"
when we talk generally of government is a way of thinking about
government in terms of ideals; its function is to comfort society and
develop "the structure of an elaborate dream world where logic
creates justice" (Arnold 1935:33). Law provides "a great reservoir
of emotionally important social symbols," creating a realm "where
all our dreams of justice in an unjust world come true" (Arnold
1935:34-5).
Fantasy allows the subject to deal with a traumatic kernel at the
core of the symbolic order; a Real that resists harmonization in
the symbolic order (2i2ek 1989:123, 133, 169). This article analyzes
how fantasy helps occlude a traumatic element around which the
symbolic order of border law is structured-the foundation of the
"good life" with its bounty of rights, privileges, status, and opportunity on the exclusion of basic life denuded of the entitlements
that make the good life sweet (see "Why Fantasy?"; compare
Agamben 1998:7-8, 83).
This article studies how people draw on the reservoir of law's
symbols as both comfort and protest and erect fetishes that embody
unrealized hopes and diffuse the impact of the traumatic knowledge that the good life is founded on the exclusion and even death
of basic life. Fetish is used here in Zi2ek's sense, meaning the
embodiment of a false appearance that allows us to cope with, and
disavow, harsh reality (Zi~ek 2006a:253).
The first part of the article, "Query and Approach," frames the
question at the heart of the study and delineates the approach
taken to examine the issue. Finding instructive Zi ek's insight that
objects enacted by people can materialize and disclose a deeper
"truth" that people and ideology cannot afford to acknowledge,
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the article's analytical narrative is organized around the enactment
of two forms of objects: private border fences and water tanks.
These objects and projects of civil society engaged in political action
mirror in miniature the larger projects and objects of the state and
its border law and are entryways for analysis. The second part
of the article, "Fantasy and the Law," analyzes the incidents and
interviews during fieldwork that show the work of fantasy in
sustaining and regenerating policy, law, and political action that
people know to be dysfunctional. The third part of the article,
"Why Fantasy?" analyzes how people use fetishes to cope with
the traumatic knowledge that the good life is undergirded by the
exclusion of basic life.
Query and Approach
A number of works depicting migrant movement, resettlement,
and continuing ties to sending communities have theorized the
transcending of borders, translocality, and transnationality (e.g.,
Santamaria G6mez 2003:82-3; Schiller 1999:95-6, 113; Smith
1994:15-16; Rouse 1991:16-17). Migration may sometimes be
depicted as signifying "transnationalism," "hyperspace," "borderless people," and "postmodern citizens," but in the lived world
there are real and increasingly bleak and remote paths that many
undocumented migrants must take between places and to cross
borders. These paths are not just etched by migrant feet; they are
channeled and emplaced by law and policy and the practices and
perspectives of nonmigrants.
The term emplacement highlights the confined spaces of migration and the blockages that limit in lived reality the globalist imagination of transnational flows (Englund 2002:265). Migrants may
indeed move-but the flow is far from free; it is channeled and
confined to particular places and spaces by poverty, identity, danger,
and hardship. Many writers have powerfully portrayed migrant
stories and the hardships and death that migrants undergo (see, e.g.,
Nazario 2007; Urrea 2004; Annerino 2003; compare Ellingwood
2004; Conover 1987). This is a study of what sustains the practices
that shape the routes and conditions of the journey.
Query: Why Diversion Persists After Its Discrediting
In 1989, most undocumented migrants crossed the U.S.-Mexico
border near the large urban centers of San Diego-Tijuana and El
Paso-Juirez, in California and Texas (Massey et al. 2002:106; Massey 2006:A23). Temperate California had by far the greatest number
of undocumented migrants-by the mid-1990s, nearly two-thirds of
undocumented traffic came through California (Massey et al.
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2002:107). The popular crossing area was near the bustling city of
San Diego, along a 14-mile stretch from oceanfront Imperial Beach
to the base of the Otay Mountains, where crossings took only about
10 or 15 minutes across "easy terrain and gentle climbs" to a pickup
point (Hing 2001:127). Every afternoon, crowds of migrants and
smugglers collected to await nightfall and cross into the United
States (Nevins 2000:100). Undocumented migrants also made
"banzai runs" through the port of entry, running past traffic on
the highway and jumping over cars lined up at the port of entry
(Massey 2006:A23).
In early 1993, the federal government commissioned a study of
new methods of border control from Sandia National Laboratories,
a military research facility (Cornelius 2001:662). The Sandia study
recommended a strategy of "prevention through deterrence" by
increasing the difficulty of illegal entry through such methods as
installing multiple physical barriers using sophisticated electronic
surveillance equipment (Cornelius 2001:662).
At around the same time, the Border Patrol's El Paso sector
supervisor, Silvestre Reyes, came up with a plan (Cornelius
2001:662). On a Sunday morning in September 1993, he launched
a surprise border patrol maneuver dubbed Operation Blockade.'
He stationed 400 agents and dozens of patrol vehicles and helicopters on the 20 miles of border between El Paso and Ciudad
JuArez (Vila 2000:167-8). Reyes's strategy had dramatic short-term
results -apprehensions
of undocumented migrants in El Paso
dropped by 76 percent in fiscal year 1994 (Cornelius 2001:662).
Apprehension rates are a widely used, albeit highly imperfect,
proxy for undocumented migration volume (Cornelius 2001:664).
Though a study found that the people deterred were generally
"commuter migrants" who used to walk across the border to work
at service jobs in El Paso, and even by the government's account,
"smugglers and illegal immigrants heading for cities beyond the
border circumvented" the Border Patrol blockade "by shifting to
areas where more traditional apprehension tactics were in use," El
Pasoans were jubilant (Vila 2000:2, 170-1; Cornelius 2001:662-3;
Office of the Inspector General 1998:§ I.C). At least for the urban
area of El Paso, undocumented immigration was now away from
sight (see Office of the Inspector General 1998:§ I.C).
Political pressure to replicate the perceived success of Operation Blockade was intense (Cornelius 2001:663; Office of the Inspector General 1998:§ I.C). The result was Operation Gatekeeper,
the first phase of the Southwest Border Strategy (U.S. General
Accounting Office 1997:13). Operation Gatekeeper marked a shift
Operation Blockade was later renamed Operation Hold-the-Line after Mexican
government officials protested (Cornelius 2001:663).
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from "the traditional strategy of allowing aliens to enter, then apprehending them" to "a strategy that emphasized deterrence"
(Office of the Inspector General 1998:§ I.C). Resources would be
concentrated in popular crossing spots near urban areas. Government strategists "assumed that as the urban areas were controlled,
the migrant traffic would shift to more remote areas where the
Border Patrol would be able to more easily detect and apprehend
migrants" and that "natural barriers including rivers, such as the
Rio Grande in Texas, the mountains east of San Diego, and
the desert in Arizona would act as deterrents to illegal entry" (U.S.
General Accounting Office 2006:6-7).
Operation Gatekeeper was launched on October 1, 1994, and
poured resources into deflecting traffic away from San Diego
(Massey et al. 2002:106). Before Operation Gatekeeper, the San
Diego Sector of the Border Patrol had 980 agents; by June 1994,
the sector had 2,264 agents (Nevins 2000:104). Fencing extended
from 19 miles to 49 miles (Nevins 2000:104). Triple fences now
stretch along the 14 miles from the Pacific Ocean to the Otay
Mountains (Hing 2001:129). By 1998, a region that formerly experienced nearly half of all apprehensions of undocumented migrants had 16 percent (Nevins 2000:104). The Chief Patrol Agent
for the San Diego Border Patrol Sector testified to Congress about
what he termed the success of the strategy:
We have shut down traditional illegal entry routes, forcing alien
smugglers to lead illegal crossers to remote and rural regions.
Illegal aliens and smugglers are now exposed to longer and more
arduous entry routes and are subjecting themselves to greater risk
of apprehension. In short, the Border Patrol has successfilly raised
the cost and difficulty of entering the United States illegally.
(Statement of William Veal 2001:11)
But raising the costs and difficulty of border-crossing diverted
rather than deterred. As Border Patrol union president T J. Bonner explained: "Imagine the border as a big, long, skinny balloon.
When you squeeze in one part, it comes out in another. It doesn't
disappear" (McCombs 2006b: 10). In just the brief period from
1996 to 1998, non-California crossings jumped from 30 percent to
58 percent (Massey et al. 2002:108). In sparsely populated areas
that had no significant migration since the 1920s, cross-border
traffic suddenly surged, appearing like an "invasion" in its suddenness, "albeit one manufactured by U.S. border policy" (Massey
et al. 2002:108-9).
Migrants were crossing the scorching deserts and arid cold
mountains that policy strategists thought would deter (U.S. General Accounting Office 2006:9). Deaths from extreme heat and cold
climbed (U.S. General Accounting Office 2006:9, 15-16). Accord-
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ing to government figures, the number of migrant deaths in-

creased from less than 200 in 1994 to 472 deaths in 2005 alone
(U.S. General Accounting Office 2006:16). In zones of diversion
where migrants now flowed, residents not only experienced a wave
of live bodies-death also descended. In Arizona border regions,
winter, spring, and summer became a kind of death watch, with
upward-ticking body counts from migrants dying of heat and thirst
in the desert or exposure and freezing in the high mountains.
In conversations, border-area residents recall coming across
migrants with feet swollen into oozing black lumps and skin
scorched blue-black by the sun.
In an attempt to abate deaths, the Border Patrol began its
"Border Safety Initiative" in June 1998, adding rescue services to
its policing power and roles (U.S. General Accounting Office
2006:9). The Border Patrol installed rescue beacons in desert regions considered especially dangerous and deployed special search
and rescue teams, dubbed BORSTAR units, short for Border Patrol
Search, Trauma, and Rescue (U.S. General Accounting Office

2006:9). Alongside the paradigm of prevention through deterrence, there was now a paradigm of death mitigation. Despite these
efforts at death mitigation, however, high numbers of deaths in
zones of diversion persisted (McCombs 2006a:A1).
As for the prevention-through-deterrence strategy, "the primary discernible effect" was to shift traffic of undocumented
migrants (U.S. General Accounting Office 2001:1-2, 28; see also
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2001:5). The policy

of diversion also proved a business boon to smuggling groups
(Andreas 2001:116). Migrants now need smugglers to navigate the
border gauntlet (Cornelius 2001:666; Andreas 2001:116). Accord-

ing to a Border Patrol spokesman during a 2007 interview, the
rates for a guide across the desert have increased from between

$250 and $500 to more than $3,000. As prices soar, narcoticstrafficking organizations

are

muscling into the now-lucrative

people-smuggling trade (see also Cornelius 2001:668). And perversely, the policy disrupted a formerly cyclical process of migration, causing migrants to remain in the United States and send for
their families rather than risk the costly and dangerous journey

back and forth across the border (Massey et al. 2002:9). Even former Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Doris

Meissner, who oversaw the implementation of Operation Gatekeeper, observed, "The huge paradox now is that the unintended
consequences far overshadow the positive" (Cooper 2003: n.p.).
But the features of prevention through deterrence-fortified
fences and walls, tougher penalties and an influx of more Border
Patrol agents-not only persist, they are also being formalized in

legislation. Policy has proved to be law on the make. In 1996, the
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Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
levied tougher penalties for immigration-related offenses such as
illegal entry; funded an additional 1,000 Border Patrol agents
to increase the force to 10,000; and provided for two more layers
of fencing in the San Diego area and military technology such as
remote sensor units and aircraft (Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act 1996:§§101(a), 102(b)(1), 211, 334).
In 2005, the House of Representatives passed a controversial bill
making illegal presence in the United States a felony crime instead
of a civil violation and imposing mandatory minimum sentences
for offenses involving illegal entry or re-entry after deportation
(Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration
Control Act of 2005:§§203(2)(C), 204(2)(A), 204(1)(B)). In 2006,
Congress enacted the Secure Fence Act, which ordered the Secretary of Homeland Security to "take all actions" deemed "necessary and appropriate to achieve and maintain operational control
over the entire border" using technology such as unmanned aerial
vehicles, ground-based sensors, satellites, radar and at least two
layers of reinforced fencing in priority regions (Secure Fence Act
2006:§§2-3). These barriers and penalties are all sophisticated
ways of raising the costs of unauthorized entry, reflecting the continuing force of the paradigm of prevention through deterrence.
The "misery strategy," as the New York Times calls the paradigm of
raising the costs of unauthorized entry, has not only survived-it is
taking a more muscular form ("Editorial: The Misery Strategy,"
New York Times, 9 Aug. 2007, p. A23).
This history of the present frames the paradox and query at the
heart of this article: why does action persist despite knowledge of
inefficacy and take even more muscular physical form?
Approach: Landmarks of the Social Life of the Law
The place to study the paradox is the point at which the reality
of diversion instead of deterrence becomes undeniable, and is
forcefully experienced, in the zones of diversion where migrants
flowed after Operation Gatekeeper. After Operation Gatekeeper,
the proxy for migration volume, apprehensions, skyrocketed by
351 percent along the Arizona-Sonora border (Cornelius
2001:667). Migrant deaths in Arizona's Tucson sector also soared,
increasing at least threefold between 1998 and 2003, accounting
for the majority of deaths along the entire southwestern border
and 94 percent of the overall increase in migrant deaths (U.S.
General Accounting Office 2006:17-18).
This research focuses on a sparsely populated region along the
Arizona-Sonora border that experienced a surge in migrant flows
after Operation Gatekeeper. People in the region have lived
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through the policy defect, at the point at which the practice of
diversion rather than deterrence is revealed.
The study is based on 53 interviews during seven weeks of
fieldwork and additional informal conversations and interactions.
Interviewees were identified by observing border activism-related
activities, such as fence-building, border-watching "musters," water
tank servicing trips, and a meeting between a migrant rights activist
and the mayor of a nearby Mexican town. I also talked to ranchers
and other residents who lived close to the border, contacted people
referred to me by others, and met people at community venues.
Much of the fieldwork consisted of observation rather than participation, so as to remain open to studying people from different
perspectives. Participation was limited to filling water tanks and
checking water levels while riding along on water tank-refill trips.
While interviewees relied upon for this article graciously gave their
names and backgrounds along with their perspectives, I have
decided to omit names for purposes of this article.
The study is oriented by a "methodological fetishism" that
views the objects that people enact to critique and reify the law and
policy as revelatory about the social life of law and policy (compare
Appadurai 1986:5). I follow 2i2ek's insight that external materiality
can disclose "inherent antagonisms" that "the explicit formulation
of ideology"-and people generally-cannot afford to acknowledge (2i2ek 1997:3-4). The objects into which people pour their
passions, unmet hopes, and conflicts may be an entryway into exploring these emotions and their force in sustaining action. The
two objects that organize this study are water tanks and private
border fences built on ranchland. As discussed in the next sections,
these objects are ways for people to emote their fantasies for the
state and the law and are miniature mirrors and metaphors for the
policy and law of diversion and death-mitigation.

Fantasy and the Law
Fantasy is the illusion that structures behavior despite knowledge, persisting past analysis, critique, and deconstruction (2i2ek
1989:32-3; 74-5; Navaro-Yashin 2002:4). To take Zi~ek's example,
a person may know that Roman and German law are just two kinds
of law but in practice still act as if the Law itself, the abstract entity,
is realized in Roman and German law (2i ek 1989:32). Or, to draw
on a classic Realist critique of law, people may know that the law is a
package of inconsistencies accommodating a range of perspectives
but they act as if behind the law, there is a realm of Law untarnished by the "sin" of "politics," "ignorance," or "human nature"
where the operation of principles will harmoniously deliver all that
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is desired, despite the plurality of desires (compare Arnold 1935:
8-10, 33-4). What is overlooked is not reality, but the illusion
structuring reality (Ziek 1989:32-3).
Fantasy mediates between objects in reality and formal symbolic structure and proffers a "scheme" that makes certain objects
in reality a repository for desire, filling in the empty spaces in the
formal symbolic structure (Ziek 2006b:40). This insight can be
extrapolated to the symbolic order of law. Law lies in the realm of
the symbolic in Lacanian theory (Schroeder 2007:118, 126). There
is a venerable literature that has long theorized law and policy as
symbols or vehicles for symbolic assurances (e.g., Edelman
1964:37-41, 48-50; Arnold 1935:10, 17, 34-5). Arnold explained
that what we reverently call Law is a way of thinking of human
institutions in terms of ideals and a "great reservoir of emotionally
important social symbols" that create a realm somewhere where
the harmonious operation of principles makes "all our dreams of
justice in an unjust world come true" (Arnold 1935:34-5). Arnold
also observed our reluctance to acknowledge that no human institution can possibly follow any systemically consistent set of principles and our demand that institutions simultaneously symbolize
the array of inconsistent notions to which people are emotionally
responsive while appearing to be logically consistent (Arnold
1935:9-10). Fantasy's function is to conceal the inconsistency of
the symbolic order; it is "the frame through which we experience
the world as consistent and meaningful" (Zi~ek 1989:123).
Drawing on Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, Ziek has analyzed how we use objects to believe or express emotions for us,
regardless of our inner state of turmoil or even outright disbelief
(Ziek 1989:34). For example, in a spin on Marx, 21iek noted the
shift from feudalism, when humanly held beliefs and superstitions
mediated relations, to an age where emancipated people turned
rational utilitarians no longer believe but use commodities to
"believe" and mediate relations in their place (2iek 1989:33-34).
Or to take an example from border law, the more the preventionthrough-deterrence paradigm has become strained by proof of its
inefficacy, the more object-oriented it has become: more layers
of triple fencing, more sophisticated military equipment such as
remote sensors and unmanned aircraft. Zi~ek draws on the notion
in Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that belief is exterior rather than
interior (1989:34). We use external things to "objectively" perform
internal duties (Zi2ek 1989:34). For example, a Tibetan prayer
wheel signifies objectively that one is praying regardless of what
one believes internally (Ziek 1989:34-5).
To understand the role of fantasy in sustaining and regenerating border control law, we must move past the imaginary divide
of "state-versus-society" and examine the practices of people in

712

When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short

what is often designated as "civil society," where the projects of
state are normalized and regenerated (compare Navaro-Yashin
2002:2-3, 134-6). When we look to the projects in the public
domain, where state and people intertwine, we see, strikingly, at
the Arizona-Sonora border, an inscription of belief in objects similar to the techniques of border control law. Studying the people
who inscribe the objects with their beliefs and continue acting past
disillusionment is revelatory about the forces behind the social life
of the law.

The Metaphor of the Minutemen Fence
On a sunny winter day on a border-front ranch, a volunteer for
the Minutemen Fence Project sweats with the strain of tugging coils
of barbed wire. The man had retired to the border-front region.
After the surge in border crossers, he joined the Minutemen Civil
Defense Corps, which drew local and international attention for
private patrols of the border. Stringing fence-wire, the man says of
the fence-building project:
I wasn't interested in it all. I thought it was a hot dog thing that
got started because [the Minutemen leader] wanted to make a
splash. And it was. Nothing happened for six to eight months
since the two miles.
He refers to the two miles of fencing laid at a groundbreaking
ceremony for the fence-building project. A fence is not a solution,
he says, explaining:
It's more complicated than just that. I don't know if we need
guest workers, but if we have them it should be legal workers,
some wages, some taxes ... . They're doing the jobs Americans
won't do for $3.50 an hour. No human being should have to do
that.
He says he got involved with the project after seeing it stall because
someone had to carry through on the promised fence-building.
Despite his clear-eyed view of the project, and his deconstruction of rhetoric, he performs the actions like one who believes.
Belief follows action and becomes embedded in the growing physicality of the fence (compare 2i ek 1989:34, 39). Later, as more
meters of fencing take form, he says that he looked at the fence as
"symbolic" but "it also helps." He says of the fence:
To me, it symbolizes what Americans can do when they get their
dander up and get going. It should be a symbol of shame ... . A
government should protect its citizens from a foreign power. I
think we are being invaded. I think they [referring to government officials] have their heads in the sand.
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Here, he talks much like the Minutemen leader, who has said
the Minutemen fence is aimed at shaming the government into
doing its job of "sealing the border" and has critiqued the government for not doing enough, for enacting show legislation rather
than effective border control policy.
The Minutemen who I interviewed, both local-dwellers and
visitors from afar, conceive of themselves as the purer conscience or
will of the nation, unsullied by what they perceive as politicians
pandering to special interests and corporations. They see themselves as champions of laws that are at once forceful and frail-laws
strong enough to defend the nation and cure its ills, but only if they
are enforced, something that the government, in their view, is failing to do. In short, the Minutemen are "more statist than the state"
(compare Navaro-Yashin 2002:119).
I use the term state in the anthropological sense, signifying that
"imagery of power" and "screen for political desire" increasingly
intertwined with the notion of nation so that the terms "are often
used interchangeably in scholarly discourse" (Arextaga 2003:
394-6; Sharma & Gupta 2006:7). The state appears to be a framework or apparatus set apart from society because of modern techniques of governing, such as the specification of functions and
systems of surveillance and supervision, which creates the effect of a
structure that stands apart (Mitchell 1991:93-5). Despite this manufactured effect, people and state are not in opposition, but in the
same domain (Navaro-Yashin 2002:2).
Though the Minutemen deplore the government for its inefficacies and projects that turn out to be staged shows rather than
solutions, they also fervently desire it to descend at the border in all
its imagined omniscient power. But when the government seems to
respond to the calls for walls and military, the action is never seen
as enough, never the awesome power demanded. For example,
after the Minutemen announced in April 2006 that they would
start building the Minutemen fence if the military was not sent to
"secure" the border, the government deployed 6,000 members of
the National Guard in May 2006 to stud the border with barriers
such as railroad ties and concrete posts-but the Minutemen
denounced the deployment as an insufficient "charade" and
"big political stunt" and still started their own fence (Clark 2006).
What is striking is how the Minutemen's fence-building has
become a metaphor in miniature for the government action critiqued. About six months after the Minutemen announced the
fence project as their latest government-shaming and goading
project, Congress enacted the Secure Fence Act of 2006. The act
was widely perceived by people across the political spectrum to be a
piece of show to garner headlines in an election year and was critiqued by the Minutemen as such. The Minutemen pointed to the
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insufficient money available to back the fence-building mandate
and the fact that even if fully funded, the legislation provides for
fencing of less than half- about 700 miles - of the nearly 2,000mile-long U.S.-Mexico bordei, using primarily "virtual" fencing,
cameras, sensors, and the like rather than "real" physical barriers.
Compare the disparity between ambition and reality of the
Minutemen fence. As originally envisioned, the Minutemen fence
was modeled after the Israeli fence in Gaza and the West Bank,
with two layers of fencing interlaced with cameras and flanked by
razor wire and trenches. The largest length of the Minutemen
fence, however, is not the foreboding fantasy fence-it is a much
more down-to-earth traditional livestock fence. Moreover, though
the Minutemen dream of building several stretches of fences across
private land along the border and ultimately linking them,
Minutemen fences are actually rising on two ranches covering less
than 12 miles of the 362-mile Arizona-Sonora border (McCombs
2006c: n.p.).
The first ranchers to accept the Minutemen's offer of a free
fence had initially contemplated building a fence to keep the Minutemen off their ranch. The ranchers explained that it was initially
hard to understand why people from outside the community, who
did not seem to have a personal stake in what was happening, were
coming to patrol the border. From a lifetime of experience in the
borderlands, the ranchers were used to the cyclical comings and
goings of border crossers, usually men coming to work for a season
and then returning home to families in Mexico. Before Operation
Gatekeeper, the ranchers would see less than 50 border crossers a
year coming individually or in twos and threes.
In the 1990s, however, the pattern dramatically shifted-large
groups of people lead by guides would cut across their ranch
instead of one or two men at a time. They would see around 100
or more people a day coming across their ranch. Not only migrants
were cutting across their property: narcotics traffickers also shifted
their patterns because of border fortification in prioritized areas
and would do "run-throughs," tearing across the ranch in vehicles,
displaying an AK-47 to keep the ranchers quiescent. The ranchers
usually worked alone and unarmed-for what good would a firearm do against an AK-47? With the increasing cross-border traffic
came law enforcement chases, also tearing through the ranch, and
killing cattle, the ranch's lifeblood.
The ranchers warmed to the Minutemen after volunteer patrols in 2005 on their property seemed to reduce the traffic of
people and vehicles, at least across their land. They came to accept
the Minutemen as people who may not have a personal stake in the
issue but nonetheless feel strongly. They agreed to a Minutemen
fence-but not the looming razor wire and trench-flanked
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Minuteman design. They allowed the Minutemen to erect tall shiny
metallic poles to show what the fantasy fence might look like for the
press, but their actual Minutemen fence was to be a traditional
livestock fence.
While the Minutemen envisioned the Minutemen fence as
keeping illegal aliens out, the ranchers' main concern was keeping
out Mexican cattle, which have not been inoculated against the
rancher's bane, hoof-and-mouth disease. When migrants cut holes
into the international boundary fence between the ranch and their
Mexican ranching neighbors, Mexican cattle would also cross.
Whereas before the border-crosser surge, a Mexican cow wandering over the border was unusual, after the rerouting of traffic, the
ranchers repatriated more than 450 head of wayward cattle.
The ranchers harbor no illusions about border walls. "A wall is
ugly and it won't work," says one of the ranchers. He describes the
reality he knows from a lifetime in Arizona:
A wall is just impossible to put on our southern border-any
border. It will not work .... Only way it will work is if they go and
put sanctions on the employers. The Israeli wall was backed by
guns; that's why it worked in Israel, that's how it worked in Berlin. And I don't agree with shooting people.
He says of the Secure Fence Act of 2006: "That's a joke. It's not
going to happen. That's a feel-good statement." He drives the
rugged and rough terrain at the border behind his ranch, and
explains how some areas simply cannot be walled because of deep
ravines or steep ridges. Attempts to throw up barriers would trap
wildlife and disrupt the natural environment. Border crossers will
just climb right over the fence or go through it.
Both the mayor of a nearby small Mexican border town and a
migrant shelter worker who has interviewed hundreds of migrants
similarly say that walls can grow higher and uglier and migrants
will still go over them, through them or around them, at increased
risk to their lives. The shelter worker explains the migrants'
perception of walls:
They think of it as money down the drain. The walls are not
going to stop migrants. They think of it as a lot of politics. The
suffering of people's families are [sic] always going to be more
important than a wall. A lot of people see it as a very simplistic
way of attempting to solve the problems of migration where a lot
of the problems are a lot harder to solve.
The town in Mexico where the shelter is located swelled dramatically after it became a staging point for border-crossers venturing
along Arizona desert routes; people waiting to make the trip at
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nightfall gather at the town square, which is ringed by stalls selling
supplies for the crossing.
A local Border Patrol spokesman concurred about the limited
efficacy of walls, noting that as for the Minutemen's much-vaunted
cut-proof fences, the Border Patrol installed a section of such
fencing near one of the ports of entry. Within minutes, a surveillance video filmed a child successfully circumventing the fence.
What has drawn the most incredulity among the people I interviewed is not the livestock fence but the Israeli-style fence being
erected on nine-tenths of a border-front mile on another ranch a
few miles away. The rancher was also primarily concerned with
protecting cows, but he allowed the Minutemen to build the Israelistyle barrier. The most oft-repeated comment about the Israeli-style
fence from a diverse plethora of people, from supporters to critics, is
that border crossers can simply walk around the fence. People can
plainly see its limited efficacy-the fence flashes metallic in only a
tiny stretch of a vast range along the border. A young resident living
within view of the fence points out the plainly visible:
There are open spaces. It's not doing any good. I have seen
people coming down the road. They have water on them. They
thought California was right here.
Another incredulous commentator says:
It's such a joke. It's clear that it's nothing more than a shot
opportunity so they can stand around it talking. You can stand at
one end and see the other end of it.
What draws the commentary on the fence is its fantastic quality, the
patent disparity between the rhetoric of "securing the border" and
securing one's backyard-in short, the obviousness that a fence on
a prioritized area is simply a diversion around which people can
still flow.
The rancher knows that his fence is just a tiny stretch. But for
him, the fence has had a deterrent effect because people walk
around it. Several of his neighbors emphatically support the fence,
telling of their traumatic experiences with the sudden spurt of
border crossers, of the large groups of men pounding on their
door in the dead of night demanding clothes and water, of home
break-ins survived with young children huddled shaking and
crying quietly in the house, of formerly compassionate feelings
souring with the strain and stress. The intertwining of expressions
of support with the accounts indicates that the fence may be viewed
emotively, expressively.
Opponents of the fence also view it in expressive terms,
describing it as broadcasting racism, unfriendliness, hostility.
Though in person, the rancher is hospitable and friendly, and
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appears enthusiastic about getting a fancy, free fence rather than
motivated by animus, he is perceived as a bogeyman by some because of his fence, showing how the external becomes annexed to
identity (compare Strathern 1979:249-51, 254).
Volunteers working on both stretches of the Minutemen fence
can see, and many say, that the fence-building is far from "sealing
the border," the slogan-turned-goal around which they rally. At
contemplative moments past recitations of pundits' slogans, they
show a sophisticated awareness that border control problems cannot be solved without addressing the root causes of migration-the
lure ofjobs, dire poverty and desperation, and entrenched political
and economic problems.
Yet they pour their energies into building the fence. As one
volunteer explains, "At least we're doing something." 2 He elaborates, while stringing barbed-wire for the simpler Minutemen
fence:
This isn't a people fence. Right now we can't stop the illegals but
we can stop the cows ... . The fence symbolizes that citizens are
doing something with this invasion, which is one, being the cows,
and also slowing down the people invasion. It's the most we can
do with all the politics going on.
Another volunteer says that at least border crossers will not be
cutting across this rancher's backyard; they will go around the new
fence. In this assessment, he has exactly captured how diversion is
used as a proxy for deterrence. In this, the fence-building is a
striking metaphor in miniature for the government actions so vehemently critiqued-recontextualizing and rendering strikingly
apt what the Minutemen leader said to me about the group's use of
symbols such as flags and fences: "Symbols are symbols but what
we are doing is real. But it is also in a way holding a mirror up to
America and saying, 'Look."'
Of Death and Water Tanks
Diversion was only part of the region's traumatic experiences
after Operation Gatekeeper. Border crossing deaths also intertwined with daily news and life, as eastern Arizona experienced
nearly the entire surge in border crossing deaths in 1998 and 2005.
Foucault famously wrote of the shift from the sovereign power to
take life to the now-ascendant conception of the power to 'foster life
2 The Minutemen also oscillate between a pragmatic understanding of the fence's

limitations and a more muscular public rhetoric, seemingly incited by the object they are
enacting and the media attention they draw. For example, a 2007 Nfational Geographic
feature that included a prominent photo of the Israeli-style Minutemen Fence reported
that the Minutemen group "promises that if the government doesn't seal the border, it
will" (Bowden 2007:132).
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or disallow it to the point of death" (Foucault [1978] 1990:138).
When the deaths from diversion amassed until they became an
accusation about the indistinction between taking life and disallowing
life, people and the state were incited to action.3 The rising deaths
mobilized organs of government and members of the public
around the issue of preserving life, reinforcing the modern
association of power and government with fostering life-despite,
or perhaps even because of, the apparently intimate linkage
between government policies and death (compare Foucault [1978]
1990:138; 1991:100-2).
The Border Patrol began its "Border Safety Initiative" in June
1998, installing rescue beacons and offering assistance to migrants
in the form of food, water, and medical care (U.S. General
Accounting Office 2006:9). People in southeastern Arizona also
mobilized. The larger region had a history of offering aid to undocumented migrants: In the early 1980s, the big city of the
region, Tucson, was the birthplace of the "Sanctuary" movement,
a network of generally religiously affiliated people who subverted
Mexican immigration police and the U.S. Border Patrol to smuggle
Central American refugees through Mexico and into the United
States through a network of "safe houses" modeled after the
Underground Railroad for slaves in the pre-Civil War era
(Cunningham 2001:271; 1999:587). The Sanctuary movement
arose out of concern over a U.S. refugee policy blinded to the
danger and death that Central Americans faced because they were
fleeing violence in countries with U.S.-backed anti-communist
regimes (Cunningham 2001:271; 1999:586). Using undercover
agents and informants wearing "body bugs," U.S. law enforcement
infiltrated and recorded Sanctuary-related meetings, resulting in
the criminal indictment of 11 people and the conviction of eight
people on various alien-smuggling charges (Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.) v. United States 1989:520; United States v. Aguilar 1989:
667-71, n. 1; Cunningham 1999:587; Coutin 1995:549).
In the early 1990s, Tucson's Sanctuary Movement dwindled as
political developments in Central America lead Sanctuary activists
to believe that the tide of violence was turning (Cunningham
1999:594). Domestically, in 1990, a civil lawsuit by Guatemalan and
3 The accusation has been vocalized. For example, in February 1999, before the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, human rights lawyers sued the United States in
the name of Victor Nicholas Sanchez and 354 other migrants alleged to have perished
because of Operation Gatekeeper (Sanchez ("Operation Gatekeeper") (United States) 2005:"'"
1-2, 13-26). The petition contended that the United States violated Article I of the American Declaration of the Rights of Duties of Man, which declares that "[elvery human being
has the right to life," by knowingly funneling migrants toward death (Sanchez ("Operation
Gatekeeper") (United States) 2005:4'r 2, 13-14, 23-6). The commission dismissed the petition
in 2005 for failure to exhaust domestic remedies (Sanchez ("Operation Gatekeeper") (United
States) 2005:4"' 73-5).
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Salvadoran refugees resulted in a settlement in which the United
States agreed to no longer let "foreign policy" considerations about
U.S. support for a regime influence the assessment of asylum
claims (American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh 1991:799).
The surge in border deaths after Operation Gatekeeper, however, galvanized old activists and roused new community members,
including many secular people shocked by the seemingly ceaseless
deaths so close to their community. Numerous humanitarian organizations and projects were launched. Old Sanctuary members
blended with new projects and groups. For example, the minister
of Tucson's Southside Presbyterian Church, who had publicly announced the Sanctuary movement's aid to refugees-and was
criminally convicted for his efforts-launched the group "No More
Deaths" to give food, water, and medical aid to border crossers.
The next year, two young No More Deaths volunteers found
transporting three migrants were criminally indicted for aliensmuggling, though the volunteers argued they were taking the
migrants to the hospital for treatment of severe dehydration and
hunger. Criminal charges were later dismissed by a U.S. district
judge, who ruled that the volunteers reasonably believed they had
the approval of Border Patrol for their activities, based on a series
of meetings between humanitarian workers and Border Patrol
officials, who had appeared to clear the humanitarian aid protocol
(United States v. Strauss 2006:1-5). The judge made clear, however,
that the ruling was confined to the "unique circumstances" of the
case and that in the future, volunteers "could be arrested and
charged, at the least, with reckless disregard of the law" now that
the Border Patrol had made clear that it did not sanction the
transportation of undocumented migrants (United States v. Strauss
2006:7). A pall of uncertainty and worry hangs over activists, who
in conversations sometimes seem torn by openness and passion for
their work and suspicion conditioned by experience.
In this tense and uncertain domain, I focus on people erecting
water tanks along migrant routes because of a remarkable aspect of
their activities: they have succeeded in obtaining the support of
government authorities and blurring the boundaries between government and private activity. The group, called Humane Borders,
has obtained rights of entry and permits from a range of city, state,
and federal officials to establish and maintain water tanks along
migrant routes. Not only do they have permission-they even
receive money from Pima County (Arizona) authorities to maintain
water tanks on county land. Viewing the mounting deaths as
a health emergency, Pima County officials authorized $25,000
in funding for water tanks under their general authority
to provide for public safety. An influential and long-serving local
official recalls:
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The first priority was sensitivity about human life. Humane
Borders came in with a plan based on moralistic grounds-based
on saving human life. Officials agreed on a moralistic level ....
Pima County was the first county in the nation to offer financial

assistance to offer water stations in the desert.
Elected officials had to face accusations of aiding and abetting
illegal entry. But number one, it's about human life ... . Humane

Borders have permission from federal, state, and local governments to place water stations in the desert. The truth is that
people are going to cross regardless of the walls and they need to
do things to make things safer for people who travel through the
corridors.
The water tanks also encapsulate a critique of the federal government's policy that pushes migrants to the most dangerous parts of
the desert. The executive director for Humane Borders comes
close to tears explaining, "We've designed a system that kills
people." In defending against accusations by angered members of
the public that they are illegally aiding and abetting migrants,
however, Humane Borders workers point out that the Border
Patrol are the biggest humanitarians of all, spending millions to
mount migrant rescue operations. The executive director explains:
The Minutemen and the humanitarians are both supplementing
the government. There are not enough agents for all the
migrants. Both sides are engaged in the same thought-that it's
too big for any government or entity.
From the perspective of the humanitarians, "the government
cannot do enough to save lives."
It is all too apparent to Humane Borders workers that their
efforts, like the Border Patrol's ameliorative efforts, are not abating
the overall number of deaths. The number of border crossing
deaths has not decreased appreciably from the alarming spike in
2000, when Humane Borders was founded. Since 2000, more than
1,000 bodies presumed to be perished migrants have been found
(McCombs 2006a:A1). Humane Borders volunteers try to take
heart in the finding that spatially, the distribution of migrant deaths
appears nonrandomly distributed farther from water tanks along a
corridor for crossings that they have lined with water tanks,
suggesting that the water stations may have an effect (Chamblee
et al. 2006:26-7). They also find comfort in the knowledge that on
the Mexico side of the border, volunteers maintaining water stations report much migrant usage and encounters with migrants in
need of water.
But volunteers also know that once across the border in the
United States, migrants are moving away from some of the main
corridors where water tanks have been established because of
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border militarization. Migrant traffic and deaths are shifting to
more remote areas on the Tohono O'odham Nation, where
Humane Borders cannot establish water tanks because of the
Tohono O'odham community's frustration over the problems with
the surge of mass migration on their land and refusal to have anything perceived as potentially encouraging crossings.
Despite what they know, Humane Borders workers do what
they can, driving more than 100 miles each week and sometimes
biweekly or even daily, depending on the terms of their land-use
permits, to check on water stations. Even where water tanks are
full, showing no migrant usage, volunteers walk around the area,
in search of elusive signs of migrant passage. Their actions manifest
the hope of saving life, even when that hope has been strained by
experience.

Why Fantasy?
Fantasy, 2iek writes, "obfuscates the true horror of a situation"
(Zilek 1997:6). What is the horror that drives people to persistently
-passionately even-act despite what they know? For the Minutemen, the oft-stated horror is one of perceived invasion, of the
porosity of the walls and doors of their nation-home that they desire sealed so that they can achieve security. For the Humane Borders activists, the horror is death. Humane Borders workers collect
death data from morgues and from government agencies at various levels, trying to piece together names, ages, background, cause
of death, even the body's posture at death, like an awful epitaph,
from the ravaged and bloated bodies often found unidentifiable
and anonymous in the desert. In the racialized faces and names of
the migrant dead, there is a silent accusation that race plays a
regulating role in the economy of biopower and the distribution of
death (compare Mbembe 2003:17, citing Foucault 1997:214, 228;
compare Rosas 2006:339).
But there is also another layer of horror, an existential one.
Fantasy conceals an antagonistic split, a traumatic kernel in the
symbolic order (Zi ek 1989:123, 133). In the context of the symbolic order of border law and policy, the traumatic element is that
the good life-with its bounteous material, physical, psychical, and
political joys, its many rights and privileges, its tidiness and orderliness, its status as a thing of desire and aspiration-is founded on
the exclusion of a multitude consigned to something less, a basic
life without what makes the good life sweet.
An aspect of the horror is the radical contingency as to who is
born to the good life and who is excluded. The human faces behind the arbitrariness are haunting and frequently encountered or
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recollected by border-area residents: a man who in childhood was
deported while studying at a U.S. high school when it was discovered that he was not authorized to be in the United States, now
living in a drug-violence-beset Mexican border town and fearful
for the future of his son.
Encounters occur across the political spectrum and divergences
in views. A local resident-who became a volunteer coordinator for
Minutemen fence-building-recollects:
We saw two by the highway. And one had his tennis shoe totally
ripped off on the bottom and he'd been walking in the desert and
he was bloody and crippled. They were laying by the road. All we
had at the time was Starbucks, what we were drinking was a
Starbucks, and we gave them our Starbucks.
Many writers have remarked on how the law is used to naturalize
and obscure the colossal consequences of the arbitrariness. Writers
have analyzed how the legal term alien supplants the individual
human behind the legal prohibition with an ominous abstraction
that signifies unbelonging (see Ngai 2003:77; Rodriguez 1997:
230-2). The words alien or illegal cover over the arbitrariness of a
person's national identity even while generating the consequences
of the identity (compare De Genova 2002:427; Navaro-Yashin
2003:86). The very criminalization of undocumented migration
has been called a "tactic" to legitimize the plight of border crossers
(Meneses 2003:268-9).
Law is a powerful device for the repression of unhappy realization because law has the power of circularity-law is obeyed
tautologically because it is law: "law is law" (Ziek 1989:37; compare Hegel [1807] 1967:400, 445, 453). As the theorists of legal
autopoiesis observe, the legal system reproduces normativity in a
self-referential process (Nerhot 1988:313), and it reproduces itself
and selects which information counts through normative selfreference (Luhmann 1985:114). Law proffers a symbolic order that
helps obscure the founding of the good life on the exclusion of
basic life and the radical contingency of who is born to the benefits
and who is excluded.
Good Life, Bare Life, Basic Life
A woman looking at the line of lights, barriers, and surveillance
equipment near the port of entry tells me wistfully that she does
not believe in borders, that she wishes people could just move
freely. We would have to make adjustments to our ways of life,
accept more crowding, more open poverty, a generally lower standard of life, she says, but we can learn to deal with it. This trade-off
is part of what galvanizes supporters of tough border controls.
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The fence-building volunteer coordinator's comments capture
sentiments expressed by several others:
I do care about them, I do care, and especially the underdogs. I
do care about them. But it's easy-I don't know how to put itit's easy to be liberal. Very easy. Because all you have to do is go to
that place in your stomach ... . But we need to find real solutions
so people don't suffer. My attitude is we need to get after Mexico
to take care of their people. I really believe that. I think they're
ethnic cleansing, I think there are some really horrific things that
go on with the poverty down there and I know why these people
want to come here. On the other hand, we can't solve the world's
problems. We're in debt in this country.
Later she elaborates more on what troubles her: She has lived a
good life as a middle-class American, as the first of the baby boomers, and worries whether her children and grandchildren will have
the same quality of life:
I want my grandchildren to grow up and have a country to live in.
I had that privilege. I've had a very nice life as a middle-class
American. My bills are paid, I take in a movie, go to dinner once
in a while. I don't have a lot of needs. I want my grandchildren,
my children, to have the same opportunities. I already see it with
my children, not having the same opportunities that I had after
World War II. As I grew up, we had nothing but opportunities.
We could do anything we wanted, we could go to any college we
wanted. We could get scholarships, we didn't have to get Pell
grants. So I had all these opportunities. And my children have to
fight harder for these opportunities.
In myriad mundane ways, she sees how things have changed, like
when she could not register for college classes when she decided to
go back to school because the classes were too full. "As I see my
grandchildren growing up, I see the opportunities going away,"
she says.
In an array of personal ways, residents near eastern Arizona,
who formerly did not view themselves as "political," describe their
perceptions of the Third World encroaching on their good life. A
mining history buff who retired to a graceful house at the base of
the Huachuca Mountains talks of how he is now fearful to tramp in
the mountains, where he used to explore for artifacts, because of
the large groups lead by smugglers. He talks of finding the detritus
of mass human crossing: plastic bags, diapers, bottles, cans, backpacks. Another local resident describes the shift in her views after
the surge in migration brought large groups of border crossers to
her yard and door:
A lot of people are coming for work but a lot of people demand
food, demand money. I have had people ask for cigarettes, want
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to use the phone. A lot of the time it's whole bunches of young
people and one coyote [a border-crossing guide]. Now it's a lot of
women and children coming; some groups are mixed with
women and children ... . I don't think that anybody that doesn't

live on the border knows what we are going through. It's morning, day, and night, with no days off.... When I was growing up,
it was not as much of an issue. They were not coming in the
hundreds and thousands.
In the lusher, more densely populated regions of San Diego, Rouse
recorded more starkly the tension arising at the juncture between
the First World's vision of the good life and the Third World. He
described how million-dollar mansions are close to the "squalid,
plywood-and-cardboard hooches" and "ramshackle encampments" of migrants and how "[e]xtreme poverty, homelessness,
underground economies, new forms of domestic service, and
sweatshops exist side by side with yuppie affluence, futuristic office
blocks, and all the other accoutrements of high-tech postindustrialism" (Rouse 1991:17). Scholars of the U.S.-Mexico borderland
frequently write of how nowhere else in the world is the gradient
between rich nation abutting poor nation as sharp as that between
the United States and Mexico (e.g., Martinez 1994:27; Alvarez Jr.
1995:451). Rouse explained that migrants are associated with the
increasing prevalence of Third World ways of life "in a country
often treated as the apogee of the First World" (Rouse 1991:16).
Rouse quoted a suburban resident: "It's like we're living in
the Third World here. It doesn't seem to me that this is part of the
American Dream" (Rouse 1991:17).
Aristotle famously distinguished between the "simple fact of
living" and the model community's goal of fostering "politically
qualified life"-"born with regard to life but existing essentially
with regard to the good life" (Agamben 1998:2). Agamben made
two intriguing claims: (1) "In Western politics, bare life has the
peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of
men," and (2) "The fundamental categorical pair of Western
politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political
existence, zog/bios, exclusion/inclusion" (Agamben 1998:7-8; emphasis in original). The fears and experiences of the borderlands
First Worlders, with their instinctive sense that their "good life"
exists in separation from bare life, have a sharp resonance with
these distinctions.
"Bare life" is the zoj of the Greeks, the basic biological fact of
living common to all living beings (Agamben 1998:1, 4). Bare life is
also "the bearer of the link between violence and law," the violence
that installs law, and the violence that preserves law, for Walter
Benjamin (Agamben 1998:63-5). Contra Foucault, Agamben
conceived of power's concern with bare life not as a marker of
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modernity, but as an ancient foundational phenomenon in Western
politics (Agamben 1998:9). Agamben excavated an obscure figure
of Roman law, homo sacer, as the originary figure of life in the sovereign ban, a bare life outside human jurisdiction that may be
killed without committing homicide and yet also a sacred life outside of divine law that may not be sacrificed (Agamben 1998:82-3).
Homo sacer "preserves the memory of the originary exclusion
through which the political dimension was first constituted"
(Agamben 1998:83).
The instinctual understanding of everyday people is a stark
permutation of the philosopher's elegant metaphysical point: The
foundation for the good life of the polis is exclusion of life relegated
to being basic, perhaps even bare. I use the term basic life to refer to
an intermediate gradation between good life and bare life-basic
life is denuded of the political and social entitlements that make the
good life sweet, including the right of inclusion, but retains rights
and protections that preserve a core of biological life, such as the
right not to be killed or beaten.
Some commentators have called the U.S.-Mexico borderlands
a state of exception, (Rosas 2006:339; Michaelson 2005:89), but the
borderlands are not a state of exception in Agamben's specific
sense of a place where law is suspended (compare Agamben
1998:166-74). Agamben made clear that the state of exception
"is not a special kind of law (like the law of war)"; rather it is "a
suspension of the juridical order itself" (Agamben 2005:4). The
law is not suspended at the borderlands and indeed intervenes
against the reducing of the undocumented migrant to the analogue
of homo sacer. One who treats the migrant as homo sacer is subject
to civil and criminal sanctions, and private groups such as the
Minutemen are acutely aware of this, talking heatedly about penalties. Migrants are thus not exactly bare life, denuded of all rights
and protections, but theirs is a starkly basic life, denuded of the
political and social entitlements that make the good life sweet.
Agamben localized the problematic of the politics of life to
Western metaphysics and politics, but is it really so cabined? Postrevolutionary, non-Western, nondemocratic spaces have also been
the site of tight and intimate linkages between bare life, good life,
and exclusion. In post-revolutionary Communist China, for
example, officials quickly embarked on a strategy of migration
control through the hukou system, which locked masses of people in
the countryside, unable to access the relatively good life in the
cities, where people had security and a wide range of social services
-but only for a limited number (Cheng & Selden 1994:644, 650).
China's cities looked as if they were free of poverty, without squatters or beggars, but this was founded on the discarding of "surplus" people to the countryside to live bare lives, in misery and
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famine and without social services (Cheng & Selden 1994:644,
650). In that post-revolutionary, non-Western space, the good life
of the city was founded on the exclusion of bare life. The cruel logic
about the foundation of the good life is certainly not limited to the
West or democracies. The post-revolutionaries, despite all their
promises and dreams, operated under the same cruel logic.
Fetishes as Coping
People yearn for a cured world. Interviewees at the border
speak passionately about enforcing the Law or fixing the Law, in a
way resonant with Arnold's long-ago explanation that the Law is a
way of conceiving of human institutions in terms of ideals and the
mode for developing a beautiful dream of what could be, if "sin" in
whatever form conceived-"politics" or "ignorance" or the cruelties of "human nature"-were expiated (see Arnold 1935:8, 33).
People may yearn and "demand that government institutions
symbolize a beautiful dream" (see Arnold 1935:33), but they are
also aware of the painful distance between desire and reality. The
tandem moves of law and the public toward enacting objects studied here highlight a mechanism for coping: constructing fetishes of
visions unrealized and fetishes that diffuse the impact of the traumatic knowledge that good life is founded on exclusion of basic life.
Fetish is a word that has survived its deconstruction, persisting
productively despite critiques of its discursive promiscuousness
and dubious pedigree (compare, e.g., Pietz 1985:5, 8, 10; 1987:24;
1988:105-6; MacGaffey 1994:124 with Taussig 1992:111-40;
1980:4-12). As Pietz analyzed in depth, fetish has come to have
different theoretical and intellectual incarnations. The concept of
fetish used here is that offered by 2i ek, drawing on Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory, signifying "a symptom d 1'envers"-while a
symptom is the point at which repressed truth erupts from false
appearance, "a fetish is the embodiment of the lie which enables us
to sustain the unbearable truth" (2i~ek 2006a:253). 4 To take Zi~ek's
example, a man knows his wife is dead but clings to some feature
that disavows her death (2ifek 2006a:253). Fetishes help us "cope
with harsh reality" by diffusing reality's full impact (Ziek
2006a:253-4). The person clinging to a fetish is fully aware of a
traumatic truth, can discuss it rationally, but clings to the fetish as
the embodiment of a disavowal of the traumatic reality (Ziek
2006a:253).
We have seen some of these objects constructed at the border,
mimicking some of the emotionally salient symbols of law and
4 As embodiments of a false appearance, fetishes share the metaphoric character of
symptoms. Compare Redding (1997:1129), defining symptom as metaphor, with Caudill
1997:61, analyzing metaphoric features of law.
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policy in unconscious or semi-conscious parody. Law incarnates
itself in the Secure Fence Act of 2006 and other barrier-building
legislation; people enact their own private border fences. Policy
turns to putting the Border Patrol in a rescue role, bearing rescue
beacons, water, and food; people dispense their own aid and set up
high flags as beacons for the water tanks they erect.
The water tanks and security fences are both embodiments
and disavowals. The water tanks and fences embody in metaphor
the promises of the paradigms of prevention through deterrence
and death mitigation. Though they are enacted as critiques of
the unfulfilled promises of law, they also portray a disavowal of the
knowledge of inefficacy: people still earnestly pour their efforts
into these mirrors in miniature of the strategies of law and policy.
The objects diffuse the impact of the traumatic knowledge that
good life is undergirded by the exclusion and even death of basic
life. The water tanks at once dramatize and disavow the knowledge
that death and exclusion undergird the order of the good life.
They represent the need for rescue and the hope of rescue. As for
the most salient fetish of border control law-walls and fencesthere is a striking nuance to note: they are emblems of ownership.
The fence at once embodies the exclusion but also disavows the
traumatic contingency of exclusion by occluding and naturalizing it
in the emblem of property, one of law's most powerful means for
justifying the vagaries in the distribution of good fortune.
The racialized nature of exclusion is also obscured in the form
of a fence. Minutemen volunteers often say that their opposition
to illegal immigration is not about race and argue that they are
unfairly painted as racists. Their opposition, they explain, is
founded on law and against those who trespass and transgress
against the law and territorial boundaries. The fence underscores
the image of trespass and proffers an emblem of an ostensibly
facially racially neutral defense of law.
The ultimate fetish in the borderlands is the figure of the
"illegal" who becomes the sacrificial migrant because of the sovereign ban. 5 The "illegal" or sacrificial migrant-which characterization you choose depends on your perspective-is the form in
which the underlying antagonism between good life and basic life
erupts to the social surface as symptom. The "illegal" or sacrificial
migrant is literally banned from the symbolic order of law's promise of benefits, security and succor, rights and entitlements. People
variously conceive of the "illegal" as trespasser, potential terrorist,
5 Compare Zi~ek's argument that the vilified construct of the 'Jew" under Facism was
a fetish that simultaneously denied and embodied the structural impossibility of a society as
homogenous closed totality (2i;ek 1989:127). What was excluded from the vision of society
came back in the form of a paranoid construct, a social symptom in the sense of the point
where the immanent social antagonism erupts to the surface (2i~ek 1989:127-8).
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violent criminal, even bearer of disease to be repelled-vesting in
the construct of the "illegal" a warrant for exclusion and diffusing
the traumatic arbitrariness of exclusion. Other people conceive of
the sacrificial migrant as someone to be rescued by legal reform,
activism, direct and indirect aid-dealing with the traumatic
knowledge that the current mode of exclusion is linked with death
by positing the possibility of rescue.

Conclusion
Between utility and futility there is a zone of yearning for the
fulfillment of law's promise where fact and affect interact and grow
indistinct, and symbols become particularly salient. This article has
examined how the experience of living the unfulfilled promises of
law and policy's stratagems couched in terms of utility- prevention
through deterrence at the border, coupled with intervention efforts
aimed at averting death-has fueled fierce attachment to symbols
and objects embodying unrealized promises.
Fantasy, a symptom that survives past the point of discrediting,
sustains the material embodiments of the paradigms of prevention
through deterrence and death mitigation. People turn to objects
to believe for them; belief is externally manifest and broadcast
regardless of inner states of knowledge and turmoil. The objects
also serve another role, as fetishes in the sense of objects that embody a false appearance to help in coping with, and diffusing, the
impact of the traumatic knowledge that the good life is undergirded by the exclusion of basic life.
Why does attachment persist beyond knowledge? ifek, drawing on Lacan, posited that the symptom synthesized with fantasy
becomes the support of our being, a way to "avoid madness" and
"choose something" instead of nothing (iek 1989:75). As the
fence-building volunteer says, "At least we're doing something."
People bind themselves to a symbolic formation that "assures a
minimum of consistency to [their] being-in-the-world" (Ziek
1989:75). People need that dream that Arnold described, the
imagination of the possibility of a realm where the operation of
principles freed of "sin" in whatever form can deliver the manifold
promises demanded from law, policy, government, and society.
Objects do not just sustain fantasy-they can also critique with
a sharper clarity and truth because they materialize understandings too bleak to be voiced aloud (see Zi~ek 1997:3). Beyond the
critiques that the fence-builders and water tank supporters voice,
the objects they enact offer a profound critique of the limits of
border law and policy as currently conceived in satisfying the
manifold desires of protecting life, security, and humanity. The
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fetishes at the border crystallize and dramatize the structural impossibility of a law and policy that at once promise to salvage basic
life and shut it out, relegating it to remote reaches. This unconscious or semi-conscious commentary may be the
most profound
6
critique of all-and facing it a form of therapy.
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